Low and highly volatile growth define Africa's growth experience. But there is no evidence that growth volatility is associated to long term economic performance. This result may be misleading if it suggests that volatility is not important for economic and social progress. In this paper we use a variant of the method developed by Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) to identify both growth acceleration and deceleration episodes in Africa between 1975 and 2005. We find that Africa has had numerous growth acceleration episodes in the last 30 years, but also nearly a comparable number of growth collapses, offsetting most of the benefits of growth. Had Africa avoided its growth collapses, it would have grown 1.7% a year instead of 0.7%, and its GDP per capita would have been more than 30% higher in 2005. We also find that growth accelerations and decelerations have an asymmetric impact on human development outcomes. Finally, our results suggest that it is easier to identify the likely institutional and policy origins of growth decelerations than of growth accelerations.
Introduction
During the last three decades growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa) has been both low and highly variable (Ndulu et al., 2007) . Between 1975 and per capita income PPP grew by 0.7% per year, by far the lowest figure among developing regions. At the same time country growth rates were highly volatile. Interestingly, however, there is no evidence that growth volatility was associated with Africa's poor long term economic performance (Arbache and Page, 2007a ). This result is unexpected (Ramey and Ramey, 1995, Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2004) and may be misleading. Perhaps because no statistical association exists between Africa's long term growth rate and its volatility, most attempts to explain Africa's growth performance have focused on investigating the determinants of growth overtime and across countries using standard models and techniques (Ndulu et al., 2007 , O'Connell and Ndulu, 2000 , Collier and Gunning, 1999 . Instead, given Africa's high growth volatity, it may be more relevant and rewarding to examine the causes and consequences of medium term deviations from the long run trend -growth accelerations and decelerations.
Building on the work by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005) (hereafter HPR), we propose in this paper an empirical method to identify growth accelerations and decelerations relative to a country's long term growth trend. Focusing on both good times and bad times gives us a broader view of the growth experience, which we believe to be particularly relevant for Africa. To reflect the heterogeneity of African countries' long run performance, we endogenize economic conditions into the methodology by defining episodes of growth and decline relative to each country's long run trend growth. In contrast, HPR and related literature impose common parameters across countries to identify growth accelerations.
Using our methodology, we find that African countries have experienced numerous growth acceleration episodes in the last 30 years, but also a comparable number of growth collapses. In short, Africa's long run record of slow and volatile growth reflects a pattern of alternating, identifiable accelerations and declines, rather than random variations of growth rates around the long run trend. We also find that growth volatility -when viewed as the product of accelerations and declines -is not neutral and indeed matters for economic and social outcomes. To begin to address the public policy questions posed by these results, we look for correlates associated with acceleration and deceleration episodes and examine the probability that an economy will undergo a growth acceleration or deceleration. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the Africa's growth experience. Section 3 presents the methodology for identifying growth accelerations and decelerations. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 examines whether growth accelerations and decelerations matter for economic and social outcomes and looks at correlates of accelerations and decelerations. Section 6 concludes.
Africa's growth 1975-2005
Data on GDP per capita (PPP at 2000 international prices) and its growth rate are taken from the World Development Indicators, unless otherwise specified. Our sample includes all Sub-Saharan countries, except Liberia and Somalia, for which there are no GDP per capita PPP data.
1 Because we are primarily interested in examining the representative country, we use unweighted country data in the aggregate analysis unless otherwise stated.
Our time series spans from 1975 to 2005. 2 We thus have an unbalanced panel of data with T=31 and N=45. This period follows the first oil-shock and includes the commodities prices plunge, when many African economies collapsed and several conflicts erupted, the introduction of structural reforms, which brought significant changes in many economies, and the recently observed growth recovery. is evidence of a slowdown in the last years. Variance has declined since the mid-1990s and actual growth has tended to be above and closer to the trend. 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 GDP per capita Trend Cycle 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 (Arbache and Page, 2007b) .
Identifying good times and bad
We define a growth acceleration as a period that satisfies the following four conditions: Condition 1 -The forward four-year moving average growth minus the backward four-year moving average growth > 0 for a given year; i.e., the forward moving average window (t, t+1, t+2, t+3) must be higher than the backward window (t, t-1, t-2, t-3) and above 0. A signal change from (+) to (-) or vice-versa suggests growth trend shift;
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Condition 2 -The forward four-year moving average growth exceeds the country's average growth, meaning that the pace of growth during acceleration is higher than the country's trend; Condition 3 -The forward four-year moving average GDP per capita exceeds the backward four-year moving average; Condition 4 -A growth acceleration episode requires at least three years in a row satisfying conditions 1-3. An episode includes the three subsequent years after the last year that satisfies conditions 1-3; i.e., we attach the moving average window to the years identifying the growth acceleration.
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Condition 2 endogenizes the country's economic conditions, because its growth trend is a key parameter for identifying growth acceleration episodes. There is clearly a risk that by identifying a period of modest, sustained growth in a low growth economy as a growth acceleration episode we will assign too much significance to a minor change in economic performance. But it is also true that a period of relatively modest per capita growth, say 2%, may well be a genuine growth boom in a country enduring very low growth rates, and a decline in per capita income of equal magnitude could spell a serious economic collapse in a stagnant economy.
Condition 2 also helps to limit the number of identified accelerations in countries with sustained, long run growth: if a country, for example, is growing rapidly it will lift the growth trend, reducing the number of estimated accelerations. This is particularly significant for countries experiencing very low or very high growth rates. Condition 3 ensures that the growth acceleration episode is not a recovery from a recession. 4 The window size may change according to the long term growth volatility of a set of countries and/or region: the higher the volatility, the lower should be the window size if one wants to observe the effects of volatility on economic performance. 5 As an example, if conditions 1 to 3 identify growth acceleration during, say, 1991 to 1995, the years 1996, 1997 and 1998 are included as part of the episode. Thus, this growth acceleration episode comprises a period that starts in 1991 and ends in 1998.
The identification of growth deceleration episodes requires the following adjustments: in Condition 1, the forward four-year moving average growth minus the backward four-year moving average growth < 0 for a given year; in Condition 2, the forward four-year moving average growth is below the country's average growth; in Condition 3, the forward four-year moving average GDP per capita is below the backward four-year moving average.
The methodology has three main characteristics that affect the interpretation of the results: first, it identifies good and bad times rather than only focusing on rapid growth spells or deep collapses; second, it carries over inertia when identifying growth accelerations and decelerations; and third, it is sensitive to the length of time series. 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 In the case of South Africa, the average growth rates during the downturns 1982-1987 and 1989-1994 were -1.91% and -1.54%, respectively, compared to the overall mean of 0.12% ( Figure 5 ). During the growth acceleration period, 1999-2005, growth was 1.96%. 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 Pattillo, Gupta, and Carey (2005) The main differences between these two methodologies and the one proposed here are that: first, the moving average windows are bigger than ours. Second, they impose a cutoff of at least 2% in the forward minus backward moving average window, whereas we impose a cutoff of zero. Third, they impose a common minimum growth rate to define an acceleration for all countries, whereas we use the country's growth trend as the cutoff. In general, our calculations accord with those the other two studies, but since our filter is more flexible -and identifies decelerations -it picks up more episodes; we find 32% more episodes for Africa than PGC and 114% more than HPR.
6 PGC calculated the growth acceleration episodes using the HPR methodology and PPP growth data. So results in Table A1 are fairly comparable to ours, despite slight differences between the IMF and WDI data. The IMF's and WDI's data generally follow the same pattern. However, the WDI's GDP per capita tends to be slightly lower than the IMF's. For a discussion on the discrepancies between the IMF and WDI GDP data see Africa Development Indicators 2006 (p. 114). Table 1 shows the frequency of accelerations and decelerations and their associated growth rates during selected periods. For the full period there is a slightly higher probability of a growth acceleration than deceleration: 25% of the 1,243 country-year observations (total of valid observations per country per year) belong to growth accelerations, while 22% are classified as growth decelerations. ratio had dropped to 71%, mainly due to a sharp rise of accelerations to 21% from 4%. 7 To check the robustness of our results we also identified growth accelerations and decelerations by replacing 0 with +1% and -1% for acceleration and deceleration, respectively, in condition 1, but the results did not change substantially. We therefore report only the base case results because they are less restrictive. 8 The simulated growth rate without collapses takes into account growth rate during all country-years but growth deceleration years. The additional GDP per capita results from the difference in compound growth at 1. 7% and 0.7% in 1975-2005. 9 Calculated as ((0.18/0.04)-1)*100. Table 2 shows the frequency of growth acceleration and deceleration episodes by country category and compares them with the mean. In general, there is no substantial difference in the probabilities of growth acceleration and deceleration episodes for a given country category. But, while geography does not appear to matter, geology and conflict do. 10 As might be expected, oil exporters and resource rich countries have more frequent growth accelerations, but somewhat unexpectedly, the same frequency of growth decelerations as the regional average. Conflict is also important in determining good times and bad. Major conflict countries had fewer growth accelerations than the regional average but also fewer decelerations. They also had significantly lower average growth than the regional average. Taken together these results suggest that major conflict countries were trapped in a low level equilibrium. Minor conflict countries have a substantially higher probability of a growth deceleration than the average and are much more likely to experience bad times than good times. 
Results

Do growth accelerations and decelerations matter?
We have shown that growth accelerations and decelerations are an important feature of Africa's low and volatile long run growth, but do they matter for economic and social outcomes beyond their direct consequences for the rate of growth? If growth accelerations and decelerations have non-neutral impacts, one would expect that economic, social, and governance indicators will be different during such episodes than during normal times. In this section we investigate the hypothesis of non-neutrality of growth volatility by examining differences in mean values in countries experiencing growth acceleration and deceleration episodes and simple correlations between changes in key economic and social variables and the presence or absence of growth accelerations/decelerations. Table 3 shows sample averages during growth accelerations, decelerations, and "normal" times. -defined as the absence of either. Table 4 gives the correlation coefficients between a number of economic, social governance and institutional characteristics and the frequency of acceleration and deceleration episodes. Table 3 reveals an asymmetric relationship between growth accelerations and decelerations and some economic indicators. The major changes in national accounts during growth episodes take place in investments and savings rather than in consumption.
Savings and investments are higher during accelerations as compared with normal times, and substantially lower during deceleration episodes. Foreign direct investment during accelerations is six-times the figure for deceleration episodes. Table 4 shows that countries that have high savings and investment have a higher probability of growth acceleration and less probability of deceleration. Consumption is relatively lower during growth accelerations, which is consistent with the higher allocation of resources for investment. But consumption is also lower during decelerations, which is probably due to the fall in purchasing power of households.
With regard to the structure of the economy, the share of the agriculture sector is slightly higher in countries experiencing decelerations, while industry's share is slightly larger in countries going through accelerations. Correlations suggest that countries that rely more on agriculture have more spells of growth deceleration, possibly because of higher exposure to insects, draughts and other natural disasters, but also because of swings in agriculture commodity prices.
Macroeconomic management appears to be an important factor in both good times and bad times. Decelerations are accompanied by high inflation; one recent example is Zimbabwe. There is a positive correlation between inflation and the frequency of growth decelerations. Public debt is higher during both acceleration and deceleration episodes than during normal times, and government consumption falls during both accelerations and decelerations. Correlations suggest that countries that increased their debt also experienced more growth accelerations and decelerations, which may support the view that prudent debt management is important for reducing growth volatility. 
Growth deceleration
The real effective exchange rate is more competitive during growth accelerations, and highly appreciated during decelerations. Correlations suggest that exchange rate appreciation is associated with growth deceleration, whereas depreciation is associated with acceleration. There is no evidence that current accounts change during growth acceleration and deceleration.
Trade is substantially lower during decelerations. Exports and especially imports drop sharply. Correlations indicate that countries that trade less are more exposed to growth decelerations. Somewhat surprisingly, the terms of trade are lower during growth accelerations. This result may indicate that while high commodity prices trigger growth, they may not be the main factor behind medium term growth spells in Africa.
ODA as percentage of GDP is similar in both good and normal times but falls during growth decelerations. Per capita ODA, however, is higher during growth accelerations and lower during decelerations. The correlation analysis suggests that a higher share of ODA in GDP is associated with fewer growth collapses, and that countries with higher ODA per capita experience more growth accelerations have, and fewer collapses. These results indicate that ODA has been pro-cyclical, reinforcing arguments for greater predictability of ODA to underpin sustained growth.
Growth variability also impacts a number of important human development indicators. Life expectancy is substantially lower in countries experiencing growth decelerations than in normal times. The correlation coefficient is negative, suggesting that more collapses are associated with lower life expectancy. The dependency ratio is slightly lower during growth accelerations, and the correlation coefficient is negative as expected. Under 5 mortality and infant mortality are substantially higher during growth decelerations than in normal times, but they do not improve during growth accelerations.
Correlation coefficients suggest that and growth collapses are associated with increases in mortality. The primary completion rate is substantially lower in countries experiencing growth decelerations and is negatively correlated with growth collapses.
Policies and institutions are also closely associated with both good andespecially -bad times. The World Bank's CPIA score, a broad measure of policy and institutional performance, is lower during decelerations, but not significantly different between accelerations and normal times. The correlation coefficients suggest that countries with lower CPIA scores tend to experience more economic collapses.
All of the governance indicators -political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption -are lower for growth decelerations than for the region as a whole. 11 Correlation coefficients are negative, suggesting that a deterioration of governance is accompanied by more frequent growth decelerations. Voice and accountability scores are higher during growth accelerations. The correlations also suggest that countries that experience more growth accelerations have more voice and accountability and better regulatory quality.
Minor conflicts are more frequent during growth deceleration episodes than during normal times. Major conflicts are less frequent during acceleration and deceleration episodes than for the region as a whole. The correlation coefficients suggest that minor conflicts are associated with collapses, and that major conflicts hamper chances of a growth acceleration.
These results reinforce the findings of other empirical studies (Ndulu et al., 2007 , Dufrénot et al., 2006 of the close relationship between institutions and governance and economic performance in Africa. However they also reveal that governance appears to be more relevant to understanding how to avoid a growth deceleration than how to promote an acceleration. Table 5 shows the conditional probabilities of a country experiencing a growth acceleration and deceleration at the aggregate level. Models 1-4 refer to growth accelerations and Models 5-12 to growth decelerations. These regressions represent a further search for stylized facts about acceleration and deceleration episodes. No causality is inferred from the relationships and no attempt has been made to control for endogeneity of some of the right hand side variables.
Model 1 shows that a one percent change in investment is on average associated with a higher probability of a growth acceleration of about 0.1%. So, an increase of, say 10%, in investment is associated with an increase of 1% in the probability of a growth acceleration. Voice and resource-endowment (Models 2 and 3) are also positively associated with a growth acceleration. However, all coefficients are significant at only the 10% level and the R 2 are low. Model 4 shows a regression with all these correlates together. Only voice and resource-endowment remain significant at the 10% level.
All estimated coefficients of Models 5-11 have the expected sign and are significant at the 5% level. They show that more investment, higher ODA per capita, increased imports, and better governance indicators are associated with fewer growth decelerations. Model 12 shows the coefficients for all of the non-governance indicators together. In this case, only investment remains significant. The governance indicators
were not regressed together because of their very high collinearity.
Only investment is significantly associated with the conditional probability of both acceleration and deceleration episodes. This suggests that it is likely to be an important factor for predicting spells of growth and collapse at the aggregate level, but we cannot assert with confidence that it is a leading indicator, due to its probable endogeneity. Better governance indicators reduce the likelihood of growth decelerations, but they are not closely associated with more frequent accelerations. Table 6 shows fixed effect logistical models that predict the presence of a growth acceleration or deceleration at the country level. Increases in savings, foreign direct investments, and consumption increase the odds of a growth acceleration, while government consumption and major conflicts reduce the odds. In the deceleration regression, increases in savings, investment, foreign direct investment and trade reduce the odds of a growth deceleration, while inflation and minor conflicts increase the odds of collapse. 12 Only savings, foreign direct investment, and conflict appear in both regressions. These results suggest that policies aimed at attaining sustained growth and preventing growth collapses need to focus on ways to increase savings, attract foreign investments, and reduce conflicts. Note: t-test in parentheses. We find that it is easier to predict a growth deceleration than an acceleration. One explanation is that there may be few commonalities among success stories. Opportunities for growth vary with sound policies and good governance, but also with timing, initial conditions, inherited institutions, geography, availability of natural resources.
Leadership, and other less observable factors may also have a role in achieving 13 HPR using a much larger set of countries also find that growth accelerations tend to be highly unpredictable, even after controlling for the standard determinants of growth, including political changes and economic reforms. sustainable growth. Doing the wrong things -poor macroeconomic management, poor structural policies and institutions, and poor governance -appears to be a relatively broadly based predictor of a descent into bad times, heterogeneity among countries not withstanding.
We find strong evidence that economic, social, governance, and institutional variables are significantly different during acceleration and deceleration episodes. Thus, despite the apparent lack of a significant statistical relationship between growth volatility and the long run growth rate, volatility is indeed important for economic and social progress.
We also find an important asymmetry between how growth accelerations and decelerations affect human development outcomes. While growth accelerations result in relatively small improvements in human development, decelerations have important negative impacts on education and health outcomes. These results suggest that preventing growth collapses is essential should Africa want to attain the Millennium Development Goals. Note: blank space means country did not experience growth acceleration and/or deceleration. Table A3 : Frequency of growth acceleration and deceleration and growth rate at the country level
